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INTRODUCTION 
In the early 1980s, outdoor advertising was a one-billion dollar 
industry.1 Within the last twenty years, it has grown five-fold.2 Today's 
billboards both can talk.3 and they can listen.4 Spokespersons for the 
industry praise its advancements and proliferation with their own 
brand of poetry: "Things are happening up there: moving parts, eye-
* I would like to thank Brooke Reid, Marisa Bono, Margaret Curtiss, Daniel Tenny, 
and the entire Notes Office. I was simply floored by the amount of work they put into my 
Note - collectively, at least as much as I. I would also like to thank Daria Roithmayr and 
Don Herzog for their helpful insights. 
1. See Outdoor Adver. Ass'n of America, Inc., U.S. Outdoor Industry Spending over the 
Past Ten Years, at http://www.oaaa.org/outdoor (displaying table charting outdoor 
advertising by spending since 1993) (last visited Dec. 1, 2004). 
2 Id. 
3. See Clear Channel Outdoor, Why Outdoor?, at http://www.clearchanneloutdoor.com/ 
product/WhyOutdoor.asp (advertising the following: "Didn't know billboards could talk 
back? Tie your message to a toll free cellular number or ask your audience to tune into a low 
band radio frequency for more information on the ad displayed.") (last visited Dec. 1, 2004). 
4. See, e.g., Lindsay Martell, Drive-By Advertising (ABCNews television broadcast, Dec. 
27, 2002) (on file with author) (describing billboards that monitor the radio frequencies to 
which passing cars are tuned and alter their content according to the predominant 
frequency). 
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catching devices, video projection."5 Many local municipalities, 
however, are less than thrilled. Aside from the obvious visual blight,6 
outdoor advertising can compromise the safety of travelers.7 Federal 
attempts to regulate the sea of highway billboards have backfired,8 and 
local governments are left to sink or swim alone. 
Meanwhile, the waters are treacherous. The jurisprudence of visual 
clutter is in a state of disarray. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
has famously lamented the "genuine misfortune [that] the Court's 
treatment of the subject [is a] virtual Tower of Babel, from which no 
definitive principles can be clearly drawn."9 As this Note explains, 
state and local government actors must negotiate two obstacles of 
First Amendment law to arrive at a constitutionally permissible 
regulation.10 The first obstacle is the Supreme Court's decision in 
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego.11 Following Metromedia, 
regulators can neither select among noncommercial messages nor 
privilege commercial messages over noncommercial ones. The Court 
has previously defined "commercial speech" to mean, alternately, 
"expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and 
5. Clear Channel Outdoor, supra note 3. This website, which belongs to an industry 
giant, also refers to the "explosion of out of home media." Id. 
6. The Supreme Court has acknowledged "visual blight," i.e. aesthetically harmful 
objects or conditions, as a "substantive evil" in the context of outdoor advertising. Members 
of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 810 (1984). 
7. OFFICE OF SAFETY RESEARCH AND DEV., FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF 
TRANSP., RESEARCH REVIEW OF POTENTIAL SAFETY EFFECTS OF ELECTRONIC 
BILLBOARDS ON DRIVER ATTENTION AND DISTRACTION, FINAL REPORT (2001), available 
at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/realestate/elecbbrd/elecbbrd.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2004) 
(reporting on the dangers that inhere to billboards, especially electronic, such as the 
"distraction of drivers"). 
8. See generally Craig J. Albert, Your Ad Goes Here: How the Highway Beautification 
Act of 1965 Thwarts Highway Beautification, 48 U. KAN. L. Rr;v. 463 (2000) (exploring early 
federal attempts to regulate billboards that culminated in the Highway Beautification Act, 
and detailing the respective failures of these regulations to significantly reduce highway 
billboards). 
9. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 569 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
10. Billboard regulations generally implicate the First Amendment and are challenged 
on that basis. See, e.g., Lavey v. City of Two Rivers, 171 F.3d 1110 (7th Cir. 1999) (First 
Amendment challenge to a sign regulation); Ackerley Communications of Mass., Inc. v. City 
of Cambridge, 88 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 1996) (same); Messer v. City of Douglasville, 975 F.2d 
1505 (11th Cir. 1992) (same); Nat'! Adver. Co. v. City & County of Denver, 912 F.2d 405 
(10th Cir. 1990) (same); Wheeler v. Comm'r of Highways, 822 F.2d 586 (6th Cir. 1987) 
(same). Cf Dwight H. Merriam & Brian R. Smith, The First Amendment in Land Use Law, 
in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN LAND USE LAW, 0203 A.L.1.-A.B.A. VIDEO L. REV. 161, 
163 (Jan. 24, 1991) (sign regulation, unlike other land use regulation, "require[s] the 
consideration of one common issue - the protections afforded by the first amendment"). 
Challenges involving the Takings Clause do occur, see, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), but are not explored in this Note. 
11. 453 U.S. 490 (1981). 
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its [sic] audience,"12 and, more recently, expression that "propose[s] a 
commercial transaction."13 Noncommercial speech consists of all other 
protected expression.14 
After Metromedia, regulators who did not want to effectuate a 
total ban on signs took the one avenue that appeared available to 
them: they targeted only commercial speech. The Court's decision in 
City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 15 however, presented a 
second obstacle. Following Discovery Network, regulators had to 
account for why they were privileging noncommercial over 
commercial speech when neither was intrinsically more harmful to the 
public.16 A growing billboard industry, meanwhile, is happy to 
capitalize on the resulting catch-22.17 
Metromedia, though splintered18 and at times criticized,19 lays out 
the basic analytic framework for assessing the constitutionality of a 
12. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980). 
13. Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473-74 (1989). 
14. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (characterizing 
noncommercial speech as all "other varieties of speech" other than commercial). 
15. 507 U.S. 410 (1993). 
16. See infra notes 39-48 and accompanying text. 
17. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 556 (1981) (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting) (referring to the "real and growing problems every municipality faces in 
protecting safety and preserving the environment in an urban area" by regulations that the 
"billboard industry attempts to escape"); infra notes 122-123 and accompanying text. See 
also supra note 10 (providing a list of recent challenges to billboard regulations). The term 
"catch-22" is derived from a book by that title. See JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22 (1955). 
18. Daniel R. Mandelker, Sign Regulation and Free Speech: Spooking the Doppelganger, 
reprinted as Free Speech Issues in Sign Regulation, in 1 LAND USE INSTITUTE, SH018 AL.I.­
AB.A. 159, 163 (Aug. 22-24, 2002) (describing Metromedia as "badly divided"). Justice 
White wrote for four in invalidating the ordinance. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 493. Justices 
Brennan and Blackmun concurred in the judgment. Id. at 521. Justice Stevens concurred in 
part and dissented in part. Id. at 540. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist each 
dissented on separate grounds. Id. at 555, 569. 
When the Supreme Court issues an opinion with no majority, the opinion with the most 
votes is not automatically the holding of the Court. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 
193 (1977). In a so-called splintered case, on those issues that have not garnered a majority, 
"the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those [Justices] who 
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds." Id. It may be that no grounds for the 
decision to strike down the San Diego ordinance at issue in Metromedia were the narrowest. 
See Rappa v. New Castle County, 18 F.3d 1043, 1060 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Since the opinions in 
Metromedia share no common denominator, they do not establish a governing standard for 
future cases."). In the absence of obviously narrowest grounds, it is difficult to know exactly 
what precedential value the plurality opinion has. Cf Maxwell L. Steams, The Case for 
Including Marks v. United States in the Canon of Constitutional Law, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 
321, 322 (2000) ("[T]he Court is freer to disregard a plurality decision as a matter of stare 
decisis than it is to disregard a majority opinion."). The lower courts, however, have by and 
large followed the plurality holding in Metromedia. See Mandelker, supra note 18, at 163; 
infra note 35 and accompanying text. 
19. See, e.g., Rappa, 18 F.3d at 1054-61 (noting the difficulty in "divin[ing] what, if any, 
principles from Metromedia became the governing standard for future cases"). 
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billboard regulation against a First Amendment challenge. 
Metromedia involved San Diego's attempt to prohibit all advertising 
except for a narrow series of enumerated exceptions.20 Those 
exceptions included signs that relate to the property to which they are 
attached21 and twelve other categories of signs such as "government 
signs," "signs depicting time, temperature and news," and "for sale 
and for lease signs."22 The Court struck down the San Diego ordinance 
insofar as it privileged "commercial" over "noncommercial" speech, 
by allowing the former to be communicated where the latter could not 
be,23 and because the ordinance impermissibly drew distinctions within 
noncommercial speech.24 
Commentators and courts have devoted significant effort to 
unpacking Metromedia's intricate holding.25 The following several 
propositions, however, commanded a majority of the Court. First, 
aesthetics and traffic safety are valid rationales for billboard 
regulation.26 Second, the constitutionality of the effects of a regulation 
on commercial speech and noncommercial speech are to be analyzed 
separately.27 Third, regulators may distinguish between types of 
20. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 494-95. 
21. Signs that relate to the property to which they are attached are "onsite" signs while 
"offsite" signs bear no such relation. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 512 (providing a definition 
of onsite and offsite billboards). 
22. Id. at 494-95. The other exceptions were signs located at public bus stops, 
commemorative plaques, religious symbols, signs within shopping malls, signs on vehicles, 
temporary political signs, and un-displayed signs. Id. 
23. See id. at 512-13 (plurality opinion). 
24. See id. at 514-15 (plurality opinion). 
25. See, e.g., Rappa v. New Castle County, 18 F.3d 1043, 1054-61 (3d Cir. 1994); 
Katherine D. Parsons, Comment, Billboard Regulation After Metromedia and Lucas, 31 
Hous. L. REV. 1555, 1573-81 (1995); R. Douglas Bond, Note, Making Sense of Billboard 
Law: Justifying Prohibitions and Exemptions, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2482, 2488-2500 (1990). 
26. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 507-08 (plurality opinion) ("Nor can there be substantial 
doubt that the twin goals [of] traffic safety and the appearance of the city . . .  are substantial 
governmental goals."); id. at 528, 533-34 (Brennan & Blackmun, JJ., concurring) (reiterating 
this point); id. at 557 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (same). 
27. Id. at 505 (plurality opinion) ("Because our cases have constantly distinguished 
between the constitutional protection afforded commercial as opposed to noncommercial 
speech . . .  we consider separately the effect of [an] ordinance on commercial and 
noncommercial speech."); id. at 527-28 (Brennan & Blackmun, JJ., concurring) (agreeing 
with this framework). The Court affords greater protection to noncommercial speech 
because "[t]o require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and 
noncommercial speech alike could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force 
of the Amendment's guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech." Id. at 506 (quoting 
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)). Commercial speech is also 
considered more robust than noncommercial speech in that it is motivated by self-interest. 
See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 
(1976). 
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commercial speech, such that one type or category of commercial 
speech may be prohibited while another is allowed.28 
Similar distinctions cannot be made, however, within 
noncommercial speech because this would allow the government to 
"choose the appropriate subjects for public discourse."29 The Court 
held that by limiting the range of ideas that can be expressed to those 
that relate to their site of display, regulators impermissibly barred 
property owners from discussing topics irrelevant to their property.30 
Thus regulators cannot limit noncommercial messages to only those 
related to the facility to which they are attached.31 Finally, 
noncommercial speech may not be prohibited where commercial 
speech is allowed. 32 If the owner of a given location can communicate 
a commercial message of any kind on her property, she must also be 
28. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 512 (plurality opinion) ("It does not follow from the fact 
that the city has concluded that some commercial interests outweigh its municipal interests 
in this context that it must give similar weight to all other commercial advertising."); id. at 
541 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (joining Parts I through IV of the plurality opinion). Thus 
the Court held that the city could allow signs "identifying [a] place of business and 
advertising the products or services available there" - which the Court called "onsite 
commercial billboards" - while simultaneously banning billboards leased "for the purpose 
of advertising commercial enterprises located elsewhere" - or "offsite commercial 
billboards." Id. at 512 (plurality opinion). 
29. Id. at 515 (plurality opinion); id. at 533 n.10 (Brennan & Blackmun, JJ., concurring) 
(agreeing with this point); id. at 541 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (same). 
30. Id. at 514 (plurality opinion) ("Although the city may distinguish between the 
relative value of different categories of commercial speech, the city does not have the same 
range of choice in the area of noncommercial speech to evaluate the strength of, or 
distinguish between, various communicative interests."). 
31. Determining which messages are onsite necessarily entails looking to the content of 
the billboard to see if it relates to the location. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 516 (plurality 
opinion) (finding San Diego ordinance at issue content-based because it "distinguishes in 
several ways between permissible and impermissible signs at a particular location by 
reference to their content"); see supra note 21 and accompanying text (defining "onsite" and 
"offsite"). Content discrimination in general is problematic in that it '"raises the specter that 
the Government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace."' 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387 (1992) (quoting Simon & Schuster v. Members 
of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991)). 
32. The effect of the San Diego ordinance was to allow onsite commercial speech where 
noncommercial speech, if not listed among the twelve exceptions, was entirely prohibited. 
The plurality found this practice unconstitutional. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 512-13 (plurality 
opinion). Chief Justice Burger disagreed. See id. at 569 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("The 
plurality gravely misconstrues the commercial-noncommercial distinction of earlier cases 
when it holds that the preferred position of noncommercial speech compels a city to impose 
the same or greater limits on commercial as on noncommercial speech."). The lower courts, 
however, followed the plurality. See, e.g., Arlington County Republican Comm. v. Arlington 
County, 983 F.2d 587, 591 (4th Cir. 1993); Nat'! Adver. Co. v. Town of Niagara, 942 F.2d 145, 
147 (2d Cir. 1991); Ackerley Communications of Mass., Inc. v. City of Somerville, 878 F.2d 
513, 516 (1st Cir. 1989). 
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able to communicate any noncommercial message that is entitled 
protection under the First Amendment.33 
Although commercial speech could not be privileged over 
noncommercial speech, the Metromedia plurality suggested that 
noncommercial speech could be placed in a privileged position vis-a­
vis commercial speech. Justice White, writing for four, maintained that 
"the California courts may sustain the ordinance by limiting its reach 
to commercial speech" because "our judgment is based essentially on 
the inclusion of noncommercial speech within the prohibitions of the 
ordinance. "34 Lower courts took the plurality at its word: in addition to 
dutifully striking down ordinances that privileged commercial over 
noncommercial speech, they have upheld regulations that completely 
exempted noncommercial speech from their regulatory scheme.35 
Justice Brennan's concurrence in Metromedia, which questioned the 
wisdom of distinguishing between noncommercial and commercial 
speech for purposes of exemption,36 might have been a lonely voice of 
protest were it not for the 1993 decision of City of Cincinnati v. 
Discovery Network, Inc. 37 This case called into question whether 
noncommercial speech, no less offensive than commercial speech in 
terms of safety or aesthetics, could be privileged over commercial 
speech after all.38 
Discovery Network involved a municipal effort to reduce visual 
clutter caused by freestanding newsracks.39 A city ordinance banned 
only those newsracks that distributed commercial handbills on the 
theory that commercial speech "has only a low value" and the city's 
"[a]esthetic and safety interests are stronger than the interest in 
allowing commercial speakers to have similar access to the reading 
public."40 Six Justices voted to strike down the regulation, noting that 
it "seriously underestimate[d] the value of commercial speech."41 
33. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 513 (plurality opinion) ("[T]he city may not conclude that 
the communication of commercial information concerning goods and services connected 
with a particular site is of greater value than the communication of noncommercial 
messages."). 
34. Id. at 522 n.26 (plurality opinion). 
35. See, e.g., Messer v. City of Douglasville, 975 F.2d 1505 (11th Cir. 1992) (upholding 
citywide exemption from permit requirements for noncommercial speech); Major Media v. 
City of Raleigh, 792 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir. 1986) (upholding blanket regulatory exemption for 
noncommercial speech). 
36. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 536-40 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
37. 507 U.S. 410 (1993). 
38. See infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text. 
39. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 412. 
40. Id. at 418-19. 
41. Id. at 419. Of the six, however, Justice Blackmun alone would afford 
indistinguishable protection to commercial and noncommercial speech. Id. at 431 
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Analyzing the regulation under Central Hudson Gas & Electricity 
Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York42 and Board of 
Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox,43 the Court found 
an "[un]reasonable fit" between the city's ends and its means.44 The 
Court accepted that "every decrease in the number of [newsracks] 
necessarily effects an increase in safety and an improvement in the 
attractiveness . . .  [such that] the prohibition is thus entirely related to 
[the city's] legitimate interests. "45 The commercial/noncommercial 
distinction, however, "bears no relationship whatsoever to the 
particular interests that the city has asserted"46 because commercial 
newsracks "are no more harmful than the permitted newsracks."47 In 
short, the Discovery Network Court was unwilling to allow the city to 
single out commercial newsracks - newsracks that were no more ugly 
or dangerous than noncommercial newsracks - for regulation, 
without furnishing any justification beyond that commercial speech 
enjoys less First Amendment protection than noncommercial speech.48 
Despite the implication of Discovery Network for billboard 
regulation,49 varying interpretations of the case have resulted in a 
circuit split. Some lower courts have attempted to circumvent 
Discovery Network, sometimes in problematic ways. The Ninth 
Circuit, for instance, offered a 1984 Supreme Court case as proof of 
continued reliance on Metromedia in the face of Discovery Network, 
which was decided almost a decade later.50 The Eleventh Circuit, in 
(Blackmun, J., concurring) ("The present case demonstrates that there is no reason to treat 
truthful commercial speech as a class that is less 'valuable' than noncommercial speech."). 
42. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). Central Hudson provides a three-part test for analyzing the 
constitutionality of a regulation of non-misleading commercial speech involving a lawful 
activity: the government, (1) in advancing a substantial interest, may promulgate regulations 
that (2) directly advance the asserted interest, and (3) are no more extensive than is 
necessary to further that interest. Id. at 564-66. 
43. 492 U.S. 469 (1989). Fox clarifies that a "reasonable fit" is required between the 
city's ends and its means, not that the city must employ the least restrictive means available. 
Id. at 480. 
44. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 426. The Court essentially adopted the lower court's 
Central Hudson/Fox analysis. See id. at 416 (citing as "proper" the Sixth Circuit's analysis, 
946 F.2d 464 (6th Cir. 1991)). 
45. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 418 (emphasis omitted). 
46. Id. at 424 (emphasis omitted). 
47. Id. at 418. 
48. Id. at 428. 
49. As with newsracks, there is no indication that noncommercial billboards are uglier 
or more unsafe than commercial ones. See infra note 78 and accompanying text. 
50. Ackerley Communications of the N.W. Inc. v. Krochalis, 108 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th 
Cir. 1997) (citing Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 
(1984), for the proposition that Metromedia remains vital in the face of Discovery Network). 
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upholding a noncommercial exception to a commercial speech 
regulation, relegated Discovery Network to an unelaborated 
"but see" cite at the end of a long footnote.51 Other lower courts, 
however, have recognized, and sometimes expanded, the scope 
of Discovery Network.52 
Like Odysseus, would-be regulators face a dangerous path 
between two monsters.53 If a regulator plans to reduce visual clutter by 
privileging commercial over noncommercial speech or by drawing 
distinctions among noncommercial messages, she finds herself 
menaced by one monster: Metromedia. Metromedia means that if an 
advertisement for soda can be erected on a given plot of land, a 
neighboring plot must be able to display a sign in support of the local 
Congressman. Further, Metromedia means that if any property owner 
can show support for a Congressman, a sign bearing the time of day 
must also be allowed. An ordinance allowing commercial speech must 
allow noncommercial speech, and an ordinance allowing some 
noncommercial speech must allow all noncommercial speech.54 If, 
wary of Metromedia, a regulator decides instead to reduce visual 
clutter by regulating only commercial speech, she soon finds herself 
menaced by a second monster: Discovery Network. After Discovery 
Network, an ordinance is also in jeopardy if it exempts noncommercial 
speech merely because of the greater relative protection for this type 
of speech.55 Thus, if signage is to be reduced without being totally 
eliminated, very careful distinctions must be made.56 A monster guards 
each side of the regulator's path. 
51. Southlake Prop. Assocs. v. City of Morrow, 112 F.3d 1114, 1116 n.2 (11th Cir. 1992). 
52. See, e.g., Lavey v. City of Two Rivers, 171 F.3d 1110, 1115 n.16 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(noting that the Discovery Network majority opinion had denigrated the plurality opinion in 
Metromedia in a footnote); Whitton v. City of Gladstone, 54 F.3d 1400, 1403 (8th Cir. 1995) 
(invalidating regulation dealing with political signs); Rappa v. New Castle County, 18 F.3d 
1043, 1056 n.20 (3d Cir. 1994). At least one court attempted to extend Discovery Network to 
non-aesthetic regulation. See Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC, 284 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (D. 
Colo. 2003) (upholding an injunction against the "Do Not Call List" on the grounds that 
noncommercial speech was unreasonably exempted). 
53. In Greek mythology, Scylla was a sea monster that lived on one side of a narrow 
pass called the Strait of Messia. The other side was guarded by a sentient whirlpool, 
Charybdis. In THE ODYSSEY, Odysseus, who was forced to travel the strait in order to reach 
his home of Ithaca, lost six men to a surprise attack by Scylla while he was looking out for 
Charybdis. See HOMER, THE ODYSSEY, bk. 12, II. 135-94 (George Chapman trans., J.R. 
Smith 1857) (800 B.C.). 
54. See Metromedia Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 564 (1981) (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting) (noting that the plurality's opinion forces regulators to choose between a total 
ban on signage or allowing all noncommercial speech). 
55. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 418, 428 (1993). See 
also infra note 89 and accompanying text. 
56. Cf Mandelker, supra note 18, at 168 (noting that a court might hold an ordinance 
invalid both if it exempts noncommercial speech from a total ban on billboards and if it does 
not). In addition to being arguably impracticable, a total ban on speech in a public area 
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This Note argues that passing close to Discovery Network is the 
safest route - municipalities can still drastically reduce visual clutter 
by regulating commercial speech alone without violating the First 
Amendment. Part I looks at the onsite/offsite distinction, a singularly 
popular method of sign regulation, and concludes that this distinction 
runs squarely afoul of Metromedia. Part II looks at the once-accepted 
alternative route - the commercial/noncommercial distinction - and 
argues that this distinction does not run afoul of Discovery Network. 
Rather, a close reading of Discovery Network permits the regulation 
of exclusively commercial billboards where, as typically, they 
outnumber noncommercial billboards. Part III acknowledges that 
other constitutional methods of regulation exist but suggests that the 
commercial/noncommercial distinction is superior for policy reasons. 
Specifically, jealous protection of commercial speech dilutes the 
protection afforded ideas. Part III concludes that the government has 
a responsibility to offset the dilution of the "marketplace of ideas" 
that results from excessive commercial speech. 
I. A HELLER OF A TRY: THE POPULAR 0NSITE/0FFSITE 
DISTINCTION RUNS AFOUL OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
The synergy of Metromedia and Discovery Network yields a 
dangerous path for any government actor seeking to reduce, but not 
completely eliminate, outdoor signs.57 Nearly any distinction between 
types of protected speech implicates one or both of these influential 
cases.58 In the face of this constitutional catch-22, the onsite/offsite 
distinction has proved a singularly popular means to reduce visual 
clutter.59 Under this method of regulation, signs which are "onsite," 
i.e., that relate to the property to which they are attached, are 
elicits a high level of scrutiny, such that it is likely to be found unconstitutional. See United 
States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726-27 (1990). 
57. But see infra note 112 and accompanying text (discussing other methods of sign 
regulation not based on distinction drawing). 
58. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text. 
59. See Mandelker, supra note 18, at 167 ("The distinction between off-premise and on­
prernise signs is common in sign regulation."). Indeed, the Metromedia ordinance itself drew 
an onsite/offsite distinction with respect to commercial speech, permitting a ban on offsite 
commercial speech. 453 U.S. at 493 n.l. The distinction appears frequently among the lower 
courts. See, e.g., Lavey v. City of Two Rivers, 171 F.3d 1110 (7th Cir. 1999) (upholding 
onsite/offsite distinction); Ackerley Communications of Mass., Inc. v. City of Cambridge, 88 
F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 1996) (striking down onsite/offsite distinction); Messer v. City of 
Douglasville, 975 F.2d 1505 (11th Cir. 1992) (upholding onsite/offsite distinction); Nat'! 
Adver. Co. v. City & County of Denver, 912 F.2d 405 (10th Cir. 1990) (same); Wheeler v. 
Comm'r of Highways, 822 F.2d 586 (6th Cir. 1987) (same); see also Bond, supra note 25, at 
2520-22 (arguing for the viability of a modified onsite/offsite distinction, i.e., the 
"identifying/nonidentifying" distinction). 
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permitted; signs that bear no such relation are prohibi!ed.60 Despite 
the popularity of this distinction and its purported advantages, this 
Part argues that the onsite/offsite distinction has regulatory 
repercussions specifically held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. 
The onsite/offsite distinction may be attractive to regulators 
because it comports with the following intuition: certain messages, in 
that they are site-specific, can only be communicated effectively at a 
certain location. Therefore, proponents of the onsite/offsite distinction 
argue, onsite messages ought to be privileged above messages that can 
be communicated elsewhere. Indeed, regulators who favor the 
onsite/offsite distinction sometimes formulate versions of the 
distinction that are premised on whether alternative means of 
communication exist.61 The "identifying/non-identifying" distinction, 
for instance, would regulate only those signs that do not "identify the 
premises on which they are displayed."62 Similarly, the "locality test" 
would regulate only those signs with no "significant relationship 
between the content of particular speech and a specific location or its 
use."63 Only signs bearing these essential relations to their location of 
display cannot effectively communicate their message elsewhere. 
Therefore, the argument runs, onsite messages are the only messages 
that, if removed from the road, would be totally'silenced.64 
Despite its advantages, the onsite/offsite distinction runs afoul of 
the First Amendment. For instance, Metromedia does not allow 
commercial speech to exist where noncommercial messages are 
60. See Mandelker, supra note 18, at 167; supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
61. Alternative means of communication are typically associated with - indeed 
required by - time, place, or manner regulations. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 
U.S. 781, 791 (1989). Under the onsite/offsite distinction, in contrast, regulators must exempt 
a sign when no alternative means exist by which to communicate the sign's message. See 
Rappa v. New Castle County, 18 F.3d 1043, 1065 n.36 (3d Cir. 1994). This use of "alternative 
means" may be more like that considered by Chief Justice Burger in Metromedia where "the 
availability of alternative means of communication" was a factor in determining what First 
Amendment standards should be applied to the regulation of a given medium. 453 U.S. 490, 
557-58 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
62. Bond, supra note 25, at 2520. 
63. Rappa, 18 F.3d at 1065. The Rappa court elaborated on the test at follows: 
The requirement that a sign be significantly related to the property can be met in either of 
two ways. First, the state can show that a sign is particularly important to travelers on the 
nearby road . . . .  Second, the state can show that a sign better conveys its information in its 
particular location than it could anywhere else. 
Id. The court arrived at the locality test after it concluded that it was "unable to derive a 
governing standard from the splintered opinions in Metromedia." Id. at 1061. 
64. See id. at 1064 ("A sign that says 'Speed Limit 55' or 'Rest Stop' is more important 
on a highway than is a sign that says 'Rappa for Congress' . . .  (because] there is no other 
means of communication that can provide equivalent information (in the case of the 
former]."); Bond, supra note 25, at 2520 ("Onsite signs deserve protection from sign bans 
because, as they identify the premises on which they are displayed, they cannot be replaced 
by an alternative means of communication."). 
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banned.65 An onsite/offsite distinction would permit a nail factory to 
advertise nails but not to articulate the factory owner's support for 
prisoners of war, or any other opinion unrelated to nail production. 
Although a nail factory owner still might display the narrow band of 
noncommercial ideas that relate to nail manufacture, Metromedia also 
prohibits selecting among noncommercial messages.66 
Similarly, the onsite/offsite distinction leaves too much discretion 
to individual officials.67 In invalidating a set list of noncommercial 
speech categories that were exempt from the ordinance, the 
Metromedia Court warned that regulators "may not choose the 
appropriate subjects for public discourse."68 The onsite/offsite 
distinction allows an official to do just that. Presumably, a campaign 
headquarters located along the highway could display political 
advertisements that relate to the on-premise activity of gaining an 
election to office. It would be up to local officials, however, whether 
that same facility could display an "Elect Democrats" sign, or whether 
a "Pro-Choice" sign relates sufficiently to the activities of an all­
purpose medical clinic to be displayed there. Such power allows local 
officials to suppress certain topics of conversation because of the 
purported lack of "relatedness" to the site of its display.69 An official 
might "drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace" by 
65. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text. As Judge Garth noted in dissent in 
Rappa: 
Metromedia holds that if the government interest in regulating speech is not so great as to 
outweigh the placement of signs with certain commercial messages, then First Amendment 
principles dictate that such an interest is not great enough to outweigh an individual's right 
to communicate non-commercial messages in the same spot and by the same means. 
18 F.3d at 1081 (Garth, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); see also Ackerley 
Communications of Mass., Inc. v. City of Cambridge, 88 F.3d 33, 37 (1st Cir. 1996) (striking 
down an onsite/offsite distinction because "the First Amendment does not permit [cities] to 
value certain types of noncommercial speech more highly than others"). 
66. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
67. See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 151 (1969) (requiring that 
official discretion be guided by "narrow, obj ective, and definite standards" to withstand a 
First Amendment challenge); Rappa, 18 F.3d at 1085 (Garth, J., dissenting in part and 
concurring in part) (the onsite/offsite distinction "vests enforcement officials with unbridled 
discretion to decide which activities are site-specific and which are not"). The potential for 
abuse is a criticism that can admittedly be levied at any distinction. Officials may have more 
guidance, however, under one distinction regime than under another. See infra notes 109-110 
and accompanying text. 
68. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 515 (1981) (plurality opinion). 
69. Cf City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 423-24 n.19 (1993) 
("[T]he responsibility for distinguishing between [types of speech] carries with it the 
potential for invidious discrimination of disfavored subjects."). 
1888 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 103:1877 
systematically labeling as onsite those messages with which he agrees 
and labeling others as offsite.70 
Finally, the onsite/offsite distinction forces regulators to either ban 
signs from residences - since signs generally do not relate to domestic 
existence - or to exempt residences from regulation altogether.71 The 
first option violates City of Ladue v. Gilleo,72 wherein the Court noted 
that "residential signs have long been an important and distinct 
medium of expression" and cannot be completely eliminated even by 
content-neutral means.73 The second option might allow a homeowner 
to undermine the city's goals by populating his yard with ugly and 
distraction billboards. 
Couching the onsite/offsite distinction, as some proponents do, in 
terms of what cannot be communicated elsewhere does little to 
obviate the worries catalogued above. Regardless of whether 
alternative channels are available, the onsite/offsite distinction still 
confers excessive discretion upon officials74 and risks offending various 
Supreme Court precedents, such as Metromedia and Gilleo.75 
Moreover, the Court has specifically held that certain noncommercial 
speech, although not related to the site upon which it is 
communicated, nevertheless cannot be effectively communicated 
elsewhere.76 Thus, relatedness to the location of communication 
cannot be constitutionally dispositive; the onsite/offsite distinction 
remains deeply problematic. 
70. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387 (1992); see also Ackerley 
Communications, 88 F.3d at 37. 
71. See Bond, supra note 25, at 2520. 
72. 512 U.S. 43 (1994). 
73. Id. at 55. 
74. See Rappa v. New Castle County, 18 F.3d 1043, 1084-86 (3d Cir. 1994) (Garth, J., 
dissenting in part and concurring in part) (criticizing the majority's "locality test" because it 
fosters "unbridled discretion to decide which activities are site-specific"). 
75. Cf Bond, supra note 25, at 2520 (admitting that the "onsite/offsite" distinction 
"would [not] protect political signs"). 
76. The Court has specifically rejected the argument, for instance, that a person always 
has adequate alternatives for communicating ideas beyond her residence. See City of Ladue, 
512 U.S. at 57 ("Especially for persons of modest means or limited mobility, a yard or 
window sign may have no practical substitute."). Nor did the Court limit its statements to 
ideas "substantially related to" the home. See id. 
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II. IF THE GREATER CULPRIT: THE 
COMMERCIAL/NONCOMMERCIAL DISTINCTION REMAINS VIABLE 
AFTER DISCOVERY NETWORK 
Despite its popularity and advantages, then, Metromedia and other 
Supreme Court precedent have foreclosed the onsite/offsite distinction 
as a constitutional way to regulate signs. To be a viable replacement, a 
regulation that targets commercial speech must still safely traverse the 
waters guarded by Discovery Network. Discovery Network stands for 
the proposition that regulators may not single out commercial speech 
merely because it enjoys less constitutional protection.77 Just as 
commercial newsracks are no more aesthetically harmful or dangerous 
than noncommercial ones, commercial billboards are not intrinsically 
more harmful than billboards containing noncommercial messages.78 
Yet this Part argues that the logic behind Discovery Network does not 
extend to contexts where, as in billboard regulation, reducing 
commercial speech could further the municipality's goals to a greater 
degree than reducing noncommercial speech.79 
In Discovery Network, the City of Cincinnati sought to reduce 
visual clutter by eliminating only commercial newsracks.80 The city 
offered no justification for the distinction apart from the contention 
that commercial speech has low value.81 The Court found the "low 
value" justification arbitrary and therefore violative of the 
requirement that regulations of commercial speech evince a 
"reasonable fit" between their means and ends.82 Falling somewhere 
between the "least restrictive means" and "rational basis" tests,83 the 
reasonable fit test requires that the State indicate "that it has . . .  
'carefully calculated' the costs and benefits associated with the burden 
77. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 419 (1993). 
78. See Rappa, 18 F.3d at 1070. 
79. To reduce commercial speech without completely eliminating it, municipalities have 
a variety of options. For instance, a city might create commercial speech-free zones or put a 
cap on the total amount of commercial speech. A city might even resuscitate the 
onsite/offsite distinction by exempting noncommercial billboards. The problems with the 
onsite/offsite distinction, enumerated in Part I, deal primarily with the effect of the 
distinction on noncommercial speech. The exact degree to which commercial speech might 
be limited, however, is beyond the scope of this Note. 
80. 507 U.S. at 413. 
81. Id. at 418-19 ("The major premise supporting the city's argument is the proposition 
that commercial speech has only a low value."). 
82. Id. at 416-17 (citing Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)). 
83. Id. at 417 n.13. 
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on speech imposed by its prohibition."84 Further, according to the test 
there cannot exist "numerous and obvious less-burdensome 
alternatives to the restriction" for the regulation to be constitutional.85 
The Discovery Network Court "share[d] [the lower court's] 
evaluation of the 'fit' between the city's goal and its method of 
achieving it."86 The lower court's analysis characterized the 
elimination of sixty-two commercial newsracks as "minute" and 
"paltry" when between 1500 and 2000 noncommercial newsracks 
would remain.87 Although "the prohibition [was] entirely related to 
[the city's] legitimate interests in safety and [a ]esthetics," the 
elimination of commercial newsracks would "have [had] only a 
minimal impact on the overall number of newsracks."88 The difference 
in constitutionally mandated protection between commercial and 
noncommercial speech does not justify drawing a distinction between 
them that bears "no relationship whatsoever to the particular interests 
that the city has asserted."89 
The logic of Discovery Network, however, does not apply to 
billboard regulation. In contrast to the commercial newsstands at 
issue, the limitation of commercial billboards would have an enormous 
impact on visual clutter overall. Unlike the newsracks in Discovery 
Network, the vast majority of billboards are commercial.90 Thus if 
"every decrease in the number of [billboards] necessarily effects an 
increase in safety and [aesthetics],"91 the regulation of a vast majority 
of billboards, unlike the elimination of but a few newsracks, 
substantially accomplishes the government's proffered goals. 
84. Id. at 417. 
85. Id. at 417 n.13. 
86. Id. at 418. 
87. ld. (emphasis omitted). 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 424. 
90. See id. at 425 (noting the existence of evidence - albeit relatively "weak" - that 
commercial speech has a greater capacity to proliferate than noncommercial speech); 
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 536 n.13 (1981) (Brennan & Blackmun, 
JJ., concurring) ("[I]t would not be unreasonable to assume that the bulk of [billboard] 
customers advertise commercial messages."); Allison E. Gerencser, Removal of Billboards: 
Some Alternatives for Local Governments, 21 STETSON L. REV. 899, 905 (1992) (noting that 
billboards are mostly comprised of commercial speech). Cf Nat'! Adver. Co. v. Town of 
Babylon, 900 F.2d 551, 553 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting that petitioner, which commands 20% of 
the national billboard market, rents to 98% commercial interests); Clear Channel Outdoor, 
supra note 3 (indicating percentages of outdoor advertising by category; approximately 80% 
is commercial). 
91. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 418. 
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Regulators can still target commercial speech as the greater offender, 
if not as the least protected.92 
Although one reason that commercial speech enjoys lesser 
protection in the first place is its greater capacity to proliferate,93 this 
capacity is not the only reason for its lesser protection. For instance, 
the First Amendment is more concerned with protecting ideas than it 
is with protecting sales pitches.94 Furthermore, commercial speech is 
part of commerce, which is an aspect of society "traditionally subject 
to government regulation. "95 The capacity to proliferate, moreover, 
does not make individual instances of commercial speech more 
dangerous: actual proliferation does. When the Discovery Network 
Court refused to recognize the "bare assertion that the 'low value' of 
commercial speech is a sufficient justification" for banning commercial 
newsracks, it did so only "[i]n the absence of some basis for 
distinguishing between 'newspapers' and 'commercial handbills' that is 
relevant to [the] interest asserted by the city. "96 The Court then 
acknowledged the relevance of actual proliferation.97 
The Court itself may not have intended for Discovery Network to 
apply to billboard regulation. The Court was careful to limit its 
holding in Discovery Network to the facts, noting that "given certain 
facts and under certain circumstances, a community might be able to 
justify differential treatment of commercial and noncommercial 
[ speech.]"98 Billboard regulation probably presents one such set of 
circumstances. First, in finding the city's justification for its ban on 
newsracks "insufficient," the Court relied on the fact that commercial 
billboards were "no more harmful than the permitted newsracks, and 
[had] only a minimal impact on the overall number of newsracks on 
92. In other words, a regulation that reached only commercial speech where commercial 
speech is the greatest threat to safety and aesthetics would not fail the Fox test as applied by 
the Discovery Network court. 
93. See Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 439 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
94. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 n.5 (1985) 
(stating that commercial speech is "less central to the interests of the First Amendment"). 
95. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978). 
96. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 428. 
97. See id. at 418, 426. This is not to say that every sort of speech that proliferates can be 
regulated. Seven Justices in Metromedia held that the government simply could not 
differentiate between otherwise protected, noncommercial speech. Metromedia, Inc. v. City 
of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 515 (1981) (plurality opinion); id. at 533 n.10 (Brennan, J., 
concurring); id. at 541 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). Thus red political signs, for instance, 
could not be singled out for regulation, whereas red advertisements might be. 
98. 507 U.S. at 428. Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit all but ignored Discovery Network in 
upholding a ban on offsite, commercial speech in the billboard context. See Southlake Prop. 
Assocs. v. City of Morrow, 112 F.3d 1114 (11th Cir. 1997). 
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the city's sidewalks. "99 The Court emphasized impact again when it 
noted that the noncommercial newsracks were "arguably the greater 
(aestheticJ culprit because of their superior number."100 
Noncommercial speech cannot be eliminated by virtue of its greater 
proliferation because of, among other things, the standing Metromedia 
ban on privileging commercial over noncommercial speech.101 Yet 
neither Metromedia, nor Discovery Network, if properly read, stands 
in the way of reducing commercial speech where, as often, it is the 
"greater culprit."102 
Second, the Discovery Network Court never formally called 
Metromedia, which dealt directly with billboard regulation, into 
doubt.103 The Discovery Network Court distinguished Metromedia on 
the theory that the Metromedia Court never reached the question of 
whether noncommercial speech could be privileged over commercial 
speech.104 Yet the Discovery Network Court also acknowledged that in 
Metromedia, seven Justices held San Diego's interest in aesthetics and 
safety sufficient to "completely ban offsite commercial billboards" but 
not noncommercial billboards.105 Indeed, before being confronted with 
the unique facts of Discovery Network, the Court has never even 
99. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 418 (emphasis added). 
100. Id. at 426. 
101. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text. 
102. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 426. "[T]he difference between commercial price 
and product advertising and ideological communication permits regulation of the former 
'that the First Amendment would not tolerate with respect to the latter."' Metromedia, 453 
U.S. at 507 (plurality opinion) (quoting Young v. Arn. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 69 
n.32 (1976)). It should be noted that certain categories of commercial speech, e.g. "For Sale" 
signs, might have to be exempted from a ban on commercial speech, pursuant to the Court's 
decision in Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) 
(prohibiting total ban on such signs). Because Metromedia allows distinctions within 
commercial speech, this exemption will not prove constitutionally problematic. See 
Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 512 (plurality opinion); id. at 541 (Stevens, 1., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
103. See Outdoor Sys., Inc. v. City of Mesa, 997 F.2d 604, 610 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding 
"no choice but to conclude that [the Metromedia] commercial-noncommercial analytical 
distinction still exists" in the face of Discovery Network). But see Rappa v. New Castle 
County, 18 F.3d 1043, 1056 n.20 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that the preference for 
noncommercial speech articulated in Metromedia "has been significantly called into question 
by the Court's recent holding in Discovery Network"). 
104. See Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 425 n.20. In Lavey v. City of Two Rivers, 
however, the Seventh Circuit disputed the Discovery Network Court's contention that 
Metromedia never reached the question of whether noncommercial speech could be 
privileged over commercial speech. 171F.3d.1110, 1115 n.16 (7th Cir. 1999). Metromedia, as 
the Seventh Circuit pointed out, instructed the California courts that they could uphold San 
Diego Ordinance No. 10795 - which banned all offsite signs except twelve kinds of 
noncommercial signs - by construing it to apply only to commercial signs. See id. (citing 
Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 521 n.26). The Seventh Circuit argued therefore that, following 
Metromedia, noncommercial speech could be privileged generally over commercial speech. 
105. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 425 n.20. 
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implied that noncommercial speech could not be favored of 
commercial speech.106 By confronting the Metromedia opinion and 
declining to derogate its conclusions about regulating commercial 
speech, the Discovery Network Court suggests that its reasoning does 
not extend to the billboard context. 107 
Nor does the commercial/noncommercial distinction suffer from 
the constitutional infirmities of the onsite/offsite distinction. Under 
the commercial/noncommercial distinction, property owners would be 
free to display their noncommercial thoughts, and officials would not 
be able to distinguish between ideas because all ideas, as opposed to 
commercial messages, would be exempted. These onsite/offsite 
distinction problems stemmed from the distinction's very ability to 
reach noncommercial speech. 
Justice Brennan claimed that distinguishing between commercial 
and noncommercial types of speech "would [also] entail a substantial 
exercise of discretion by a city's official, [presenting] a real danger of 
curtailing noncommercial speech in the guise of regulating commercial 
speech."108 Yet the Justice admitted that the discretion of officials in 
the commercial/noncommercial regime would not be unguided 
because case law has "consistently distinguished between the 
constitutional protection afforded commercial as opposed to 
noncommercial speech. "1 09 The very existence of a category of 
commercial speech, analytically distinct from noncommercial speech, 
implies that lines can be drawn by courts and regulators alike.11° In 
106. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 443-44 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing 
Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 513) (noting that although the Court has "previously said that 
localities may not favor commercial over noncommercial speech in addressing [aesthetic] 
urban problems," the Court has "never even suggested that the converse holds true," i.e., 
that non-commercial speech could not be favored over commercial speech). 
107. Cf Lavey, 171 F.3d at 1116 (declining to hold Discovery Network applicable to 
billboard regulation because "[t]he distinction between commercial and noncommercial 
advertisements is . . .  a great deal more obvious than the distinction between newspapers and 
commercial handbills"). 
108. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 536-37 (Brennan, J., concurring). Related to the worry 
that officials will abuse their discretion, Justice Brennan believed that advertisers would 
sneak commercial messages into noncommercial billboards. See id. at 539-40 ("[T]hose who 
seek to convey commercial messages will engage in the most imaginative of exercises to 
place themselves within the safe haven of noncommercial speech."). 
109. Id. at 536 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting the plurality opinion, 453 U.S. at 504-
05). 
110. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978) (characterizing the 
difference between commercial and noncommercial as "common-sense"); Outdoor Sys., Inc. 
v. City of Mesa, 997 F.2d 604, 613 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that "city officials can and must 
rely on judicial precedent to determine what is commercial speech"); Nat'I Adver. Co. v. 
City & County of Denver, 912 F.2d 405, 410 (10th Cir. 1990) (referring to the "ample 
guidance" provided by the Court on the distinction of commercial from noncommercial 
speech). Presumably, judicial guidance will also aid officials in their efforts to differentiate 
between "real" noncommercial speech and commercial speech masquerading as such. See 
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sum, the commercial/noncommercial distinction is superior to the 
onsite/offsite distinction, if only because is does not suffer from 
constitutional defect. 
III. CERBERUS: PROTECTING THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS 
If our road signs 
Catch your eye 
Smile 
But don't forget to buy . . .  111 
Though the commercial/noncommercial distinction is superior 
to the constitutionally flawed onsite/offsite distinction, regulations 
exist that make no use of either distinction and nevertheless 
pass constitutional muster. For instance, a municipality could regulate 
all signs, regardless of content, with respect to size.112 This Part 
argues that, by reducing commercial speech overall, the 
commercial/noncommercial distinction has the added, salutary effect 
of curbing the dilution of core First Amendment expression that a 
relaxed attitude toward commercial speech perpetuates. Therefore, 
regulating only commercial speech is superior to other methods of 
reducing visual clutter for reasons of constitutional policy.113 
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Co., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983) (discussing how to characterize 
speech with commercial and noncommercial elements). Arguably, however, the relationship 
between commercial and noncommercial speech is problematic in another way. For both 
Justices Brennan and Stevens "it seems unlikely that the outdoor advertising industry will be 
able to survive if its only customers are those persons and organizations who wish to use 
billboards to convey noncommercial messages." Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 541 n.4 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); id. at 536 n.13 (Brennan, J., concurring). Thus a severe reduction of commercial 
speech might be tantamount to "a total ban on billboards." Id. at 541 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). Apart from being completely speculative - and assuming, as it does, that the 
display of noncommercial billboards is predicated on the survival of the outdoor advertising 
industry - this alleged effect occurs as the result of private, not governmental, action. Cf 
Major Media of the S.E., Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 792 F.2d 1269, 1273 (4th Cir. 1986) (noting 
that the decisions of individual property owners with respect to what messages to display 
"ha[ve] nothing to do with" the government's ordinance). But see 659 F. Supp. 470, 473 n.3 
(W.D. Va. 1987), affd in relevant part, 840 F. 2d 10 (4th Cir. 1988) (striking down a facially 
non-discriminatory ordinance which nevertheless enacted a "virtual prohibition of 
noncommercial advertising"). 
111. 1963 Burma-Shave advertisement, in The Burma-Shave Jingles, at 
http://frogcircus.org/burmashave/1963/if_our_road.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2003) 
(cataloguing Burma-Shave, roadside advertisements). 
112 See Mandelker, supra note 18, at 170. Alternatively, a city could effectuate total 
bans in select zones, such as historic districts, allowing speech to proliferate freely elsewhere. 
See, e.g., Messer v. City of Douglasville, 975 F.2d 1505 (11th Cir. 1992). 
113. A possible policy rationale for favoring the onsite/offsite distinction is that under it, 
more total signs might be eliminated. See Bond, supra note 25, at 2520. Ignoring the 
questionable constitutionality of such a distinction, see Part I, this worry assumes a calculus 
giving equal value to commercial speech. As this Part details, the Court places a higher value 
on noncommercial speech and worries more about its regulation. See Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 
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The phenomenon of dilution operates on two levels. On one level, 
jealous protection of commercial speech dilutes the protection courts 
afford ideas. On another level, core speech is diluted in a more 
pragmatic way as "the marketplace of ideas" becomes saturated with 
commercial messages. This first claim is firmly rooted in precedent. If 
over-protecting commercial speech dilutes the safeguards we afford 
ideas, exempting noncommercial speech from aesthetic regulations 
strengthens that safeguard. In his majority opinion in Fox, Justice 
Scalia wrote that "' [t]o require a parity of constitutional protection for 
commercial and noncommercial speech alike could invite dilution, 
simply by a leveling process, of the force of the [First] Amendment's 
guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech."'1 14 Other Justices 
have also specifically referred to the "inherent danger that conferring 
equal status upon commercial speech will erode the First Amendment 
protection accorded noncommercial speech. "115 
The second claim requires more development. The Supreme 
Court, in discussing the First Amendment, often employs the 
metaphor of a "marketplace of ideas. "116 The metaphor was first 
invoked by Justice Holmes in Abrams v. United States,117 where he 
stated in his dissent that "the ultimate good desired is better reached 
by free trade in ideas[;] the best test of truth is the power of the 
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market."118 The 
Court has repeatedly used and expanded this concept in its discussion 
of First Amendment issues.119 
U.S. 469, 478 (1989) (referring to the "subordinate position [of commercial speech] in the 
scale of First Amendment values"). 
114. 492 U.S. at 481 (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)). 
115. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 439 (1993) (Rehnquist, 
C.J., dissenting). '"Rather than subject the First Amendment to such a devitalization,"' 
claimed Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court '"instead ha[s] afforded commercial speech a 
limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of 
First Amendment values . . .  "' Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 
U.S. 557, 589 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456). 
116. See C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA 
L. REV. 964, 968 (1978) ("The Supreme Court steadfastly relies upon a marketplace of ideas 
theory in determining what speech is protected."). 
117. 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
118. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
119. As of November 30, 2004, the Supreme Court has cited to Abrams fifty-five times. 
The overwhelming majority of these citations, including those of such seminal First 
Amendment decisions as New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964), and 
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951), explicitly rely on the concept of the 
marketplace of ideas. 
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Just as with any market, the marketplace of ideas can be diluted, 
such that important messages are categorically devalued.120 
Commercial billboards make up the vast majority of the already 
enormous - yet ever-expanding - outdoor advertising industry.121 
Not only do billboards grow in number, they grow more aggressive. In 
1932, long before billboards could listen along to your radio, the 
Supreme Court observed that billboards "are constantly before the 
eyes of observers . . . to be seen without the exercise of choice or 
volition on their part."122 Indeed, travelers "have the message of the 
billboard thrust upon them by all the arts and devices that skill can 
produce. "123 In a commercial context, "dilution" is defined technically 
as "a decrease in the equity position of a share of stock because of the 
120. This is more than a fanciful objective correlative: Chief Justice Rehnquist has 
observed that "[t]here is no reason for believing that the marketplace of ideas is free from 
market imperfections any more than . . .  the commercial market." Central Hudson, 447 U.S. 
at 592 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 
490, 548 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Just as the regulation of an economic market may 
either enhance or curtail the free exchange of goods and services, so may regulation of the 
communications market sometimes facilitate and sometimes inhibit the exchange of 
information, ideas, and impressions."). Arguably, however, the role of the courts is to keep 
the market free from government, not private, intrusion. This sentiment is to some extent 
grounded in the First Amendment itself which provides that "Congress shall make no law . . .  
abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). Yet the 
government already "corrects" the marketplace of ideas in certain, approved circumstances. 
The Supreme Court case of Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 384-85 (1969), 
for instance, upheld the use of government-mandated blocks of radio time reserved for 
rebuttal or "set asides," in the interest of furthering public debate. Similarly, Turner 
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994), upheld "must carry" provisions, 
i.e. regulations requiring cable companies to grant access to local and public broadcasters. 
Before it was overruled on Fourteenth Amendment grounds by Adarand Constructors, Inc. 
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 568 (1990), 
upheld a plan to enhance minority ownership of television and radio stations on a theory 
that "the diversity of views and information on the airwaves serves important First 
Amendment values." Nor are efforts limited to the broadcasting paradigm: the Court in 
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission expressly upheld the government's right to limit 
the ability of corporations to exert political influence as organizations through advertising. 
540 U.S. 93, 203 (2003) ("Congress' power to prohibit corporations and unions from using 
funds in their treasuries to finance advertisements expressly advocating the election or 
defeat of candidates in federal elections has been firmly embedded in our law."). The 
occasional commentator argues that this trend in the law should be acknowledged and 
expanded. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 
19-20 (1993) (arguing that the First Amendment, properly understood, should promote 
diverse public discourse notwithstanding the cost to individual liberty); Owen M. Fiss, Why 
the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 788 (1987) ("The state [should] counteract the skew of 
public debate attributable to the market and thus preserve the essential conditions of 
democracy."). But see Robert Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the 
Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109 (1993) (criticizing the "collectivist 
theory" of the First Amendment, espoused by Sunstein and Fiss). 
121. See supra note 90. 
122. Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 110 (1932). 
123. Id. More recently, Chief Justice Burger has referred to billboards as "ugly and 
dangerous eyesores thrust upon . . .  citizens" and "large, eye-catching signs that divert the 
attention of motorists." Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 559-60 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
June 2005] Scylla or Charybdis 1897 
issuance of additional shares."124 Similarly, the "equity position" of a 
given noncommercial message - its impact on the traveler relative to 
other messages - can be said to decrease in proportion to the ever­
increasing number of overall billboards.125 
The argument that noncommercial speech is susceptible to dilution 
assumes that the world of human expression is finite - that there 
comes a point when some ideas can be crowded out. This is not a novel 
concept.126 As certain voices are added to the marketplace, others can 
be drowned out and eliminated.127 Pure competition between ideas 
cannot take place, moreover, when certain ideas are ubiquitous and 
others sporadic.128 Intuitively, the only billboard you see on your drive 
from your house to your office is likely to have a substantially greater 
impact than the one billboard nestled among fifty. Infrequently­
relayed messages cannot compete on their merits, short-circuiting 
market forces.129 In this game of ideas, which may be zero sum, 
commercial advertising is clearly a major player.130 
124. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 508 (4th ed. 
2000). 
125. The idea is not that commercial speech has no value in the marketplace of ideas. 
Commercial speech adds value in that it "assists consumers and furthers the societal interest 
in the fullest possible dissemination of information." Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. 
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1980). The danger is that commercial speech, 
which is "less central to the interests of the First Amendment," Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. 
Greenmoss Builders, Inc. , 472 U.S. 749, 758 n.5 (1985), will overwhelm speech that is 
manifestly closer to the core of First Amendment protection. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar 
Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (describing the "subordinate position" of commercial speech 
relative to noncommercial ideas). 
126. Nor is it without scientific support. See George A. Miller, The Magical Number 
Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity for Processing Information, 63 
PSYCHOL. REV. 81 (1956) (origin of popular theory that human beings can only keep seven 
items, plus or minus two, in short term memory at any given time}, available at 
http://www.well.com/user/smalin/miller.html. 
127. Patricia J. Williams, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Regrouping in Singular 
· Terms, 104 HARV. L. REV. 525, 537 (1990) ("We think of freedom of speech as something 
creative, innovative, each word like a birth of something new and different . . . .  [B]ut it also 
selectively silences even as it creates.") (emphasis added). 
128. Baker, supra note 116, at 967 (doubting "people's rational faculties . . .  to sort 
through the form and frequency of message presentation") (emphasis added}. 
129. Id. 
130. See Williams, supra note 127, at 535 ("The degree to which advertising alone 
purveys and censors information seriously threatens genuine freedom of information.") 
(emphasis added}. This Note does not make the claim, rejected in American Booksellers 
Ass 'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, that the content of particular speech, here commercial speech, is in 
some way damaging. See 771 F.2d 323, 327-32 (7th Cir. 1985), aff d 475 U.S. 1001 (1986) 
(striking down anti-pornography Jaws on the basis of content-discrimination). Rather, the 
mere proliferation of this speech, which happens to enjoy Jess protection corresponding to its 
lesser value, dampens our ability to convey legitimate ideas. Nor does this Note make the 
claim, rejected in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976), that certain speakers ought to 
be silenced to make room for others. This Note argues for rigid regulation of a category of 
speech, not a category of speaker. 
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The protection afforded speech is finite and hydraulic: the over­
protection of one category of speech has consequences for other 
expression. Removing commercial speech from the easy reach of 
regulators dilutes noncommercial speech in a second, less figurative 
sense, by presenting more targets of public attention. The reduction of 
visual clutter by the constitutional means of reducing commercial 
speech, therefore, insofar as it reduces the competition to 
noncommercial speech, reinvigorates the debate over ideas. 
CONCLUSION 
As Odysseus's ship ventured by her, each of Scylla's six fearsome 
heads rose from the water and plucked a man from the exposed 
deck. 131 Modern visual clutter jurisprudence is also guarded, albeit less 
graphically, by dangerous monsters. Given that one must pass by one 
monster or another on the path to regulation, this Note has shown that 
the creature guarding commercial speech is more an Argus than a 
Scylla: he can be lulled to sleep.132 Part I shows that the popular 
onsite/offsite distinction runs afoul of Metromedia and other Supreme 
Court decisions. Part II proves, in contrast, that privileging 
noncommercial signs over commercial ones remains a constitutional 
means by which to regulate visual clutter after Discovery Network, as 
long as the focus is the fact of commercial speech's greater 
proliferation. Part III indicates that the theory of dilution - already 
built into First Amendment jurisprudence - lends itself to practical, 
analytical extension. Aggressive regulation of commercial speech, 
therefore, serves an important policy goal by restoring the nobility of 
noncommercial ideas in the ever-competitive marketplace. 
131. See HOMER, supra note 53, bk. 12, ll. 135-94. 
132. Argus was a many-eyed monster whom the gods used to protect property. He was 
eventually slain by Hermes who lured him to sleep with music. See Jennifer Middlesworth, 
Argus, ENCYCLOPEDIA MYTHICA, at http://www.pantheon.org/articles/a/argus.html {last 
modified Jan. 31, 2004) ( online encyclopedia of Greek and Roman mythology). 
